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On Hostile Ground: Ohio's Notice to




Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act in order to specifically dele-
gate the power to manage the insurance business to the individual states.2 After
the McCarran-Ferguson Act became law, individual states enacted statutory regu-
lations regarding the management of the insurance business. These statutory
schemes include regulations and powers given to the liquidator of an insolvent
insurance company. Although every state's statutes differ, most provide the liqui-
dator with broad power to manage insolvent insurance companies.
In Benjamin v. Pipoly, the Court of Appeals of Ohio reviewed whether the
liquidator of an insolvent insurance company had the power to avoid the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements. The court held that the broad statutory power
conferred to a liquidator permitted them to affirm or disavow any contracts made
by the insolvent insurance companies, including any contractual provisions for the
arbitration of disputes. The court also expressly overruled prior Ohio case law
regarding the status of arbitration agreements in insurance insolvency.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ann H. Womer Benjamin appealed the decision of the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas to stay her action against the appellees and order that the case
proceed to arbitration.3 Appellant Benjamin is the Superintendent of the Ohio
Department of Insurance and acted as the liquidator of two insolvent companies,
Credit General Insurance Company (CGIC) and Credit General Indemnity Com-
pany (CGIND). 4 Benjamin continued the claims brought by the former Superin-
tendent of the Ohio Department of Insurance, J. Lee Covington II.5 The appellees,
Michael J. Saxon, Laura B. Darcy, John H. Fehler, Richard J. Babel, Bryan K.
Griffin, and Ronald E. Pipoly (collectively, Pipoly) served as officers and direc-
tors of CGIC and CGIND prior to the institution of liquidation proceedings.
Benjamin's original suits against Pipoly were tort claims for alleged breaches
of fiduciary duties, which were realized while Pipoly held positions as officers
1. 800 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2004).
3. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d at 52.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 52-53. Covington brought the claims against the two insolvent insurance companies while
acting as the original liquidator of the two companies. Id. at 53.
6. Id. at 52.
1
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and directors in the two insolvent insurance companies, CGIC and CGIND. 7 The
alleged breaches were founded on Pipoly's alleged knowledge and concealment of
serious financial and operational problems with CGIC and CGIND and the subse-
quent failure to correct those problems.8
As an officer or director of CGIC and GCIND, Pipoly entered into employ-
ment agreements with Phoenix Management Enterprises, Inc., which later became
known as PRS Management Group, Inc. (PRS).9 Each of the employment agree-
ments contained an arbitration provision stating that disputes related to the em-
ployment agreement should first be settled between the parties informally. If that
failed, disputes would be subjected to binding arbitration in Cleveland, Ohio, sub-
ject to the rules of the American Arbitration Association. 10
In her capacity as the liquidator of the two companies, Benjamin disavowed
all agreements to arbitrate and all of Pipoly's employment agreements."I The
Ohio code permits the liquidator of an insolvent insurance company to enter into
new contracts and affirm or disavow contracts made by the insolvent insurance
company. t2
Benjamin challenged each of the findings of the trial court.' 3 Benjamin ar-
gued that the arbitration clauses contained in the employment agreements were
unenforceable against her because she was not a party to the employment agree-
ments and because she expressly disavowed them. 14 Benjamin argued that the
strong policies embodied within Ohio's insurance liquidation statutes outweighed
the general policy favoring arbitration. 15
Pipoly argued that Benjamin "stands in the shoes" of the two companies and
is, therefore, bound by all provisions in the employment agreements. 6 Appellee
contended that Benjamin should be bound by all agreements mandating arbitra-
tion. 17 It was further argued by Pipoly that Benjamin should be bound by the
terms of the employment agreements and should be estopped from disavowing
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 53.
10. Id. The relevant portion of provision 10 of the employment agreement states:
Arbitration. In the event of any claim, dispute or disagreement arising out of, relating to, or con-
cerning the interpretation of, any term, clause or provision of this Agreement, or the relationship,
rights and obligations created by this Agreement, and upon written notice by the party asserting
any such claim, dispute or disagreement, the parties agree to confer in good faith and attempt to
resolve the claim, dispute or disagreement informally, unless equitable relief is sought to enjoin
or restrain the violation of sections 5, 6 and/or 7 hereof. If such claim, dispute or disagreement is
not resolved within thirty (30) days, the claim, dispute or disagreement shall be finally settled by
binding arbitration in Cleveland, Ohio under the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Id.
11. Id. at54.
12. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.21(A)(1 1) (West 2004). The statute states that a liquidator may
"[e]nter into such contracts as are necessary to carry out the order to liquidate, and to affirm or dis-
avow any contracts to which the insurer is a party." Id.
13. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50,55 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 55-56.
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them.18 Pipoly stated that Benjamin must enforce the arbitration agreements con-
tained in the employment agreements and other documents. 19
The trial court agreed with Pipoly and stayed the liquidation proceedings and
compelled arbitration. 20 The court found that although section 3903.21 of the
Ohio Revised Code 2' authorized the appellant to disavow certain contracts, it re-
lied on Fabe v. Columbus Ins. Co.2 2 for the proposition that consideration should
23be given to both the liquidation statutes and the arbitration clause. The trial
court found that the companies were bound by the employment agreement and
other agreements and were required to send all disputes to arbitration.
24
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that Benjamin's claim should not
be forced into arbitration. 25 The appellate court rejected Pipoly's argument that
the refusal to compel arbitration violated the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 26
because arbitration agreements are unenforceable if there are valid grounds to not
enforce an arbitration agreement "at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. ' '27 The appellate court relied on the broad power Ohio's legislature had
conferred to liquidators to affirm or disavow contracts created by the insolvent




The McCarran-Ferguson Act reserves the power to regulate and tax the busi-
ness of insurance to the individual states. 29 The act explains that the public inter-
est is best served when the states regulate their own insurance industry.30 Follow-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 54-55.
21. OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.21(A)(11) (West 2004). Appellant may "affirm or disavow any
contracts to which the insurer is a party." Id.
22. 587 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
23. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 63.
26. Id.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
28. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d at 63.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000). The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). Con-
gress enacted the Act to restore the supremacy of the states in the realm of insurance regulation after
South-Eastern determined that insurance was considered part of interstate commerce and therefore
subject to federal law. See U.S. Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491,498 (1993). The McCarran-
Ferguson Act operates as reverse preemption, wherein the power to regulate the insurance industry is
reserved to the states rather than deference to federal law. See Victoria Holstein-Childress, The En-
forceability of Arbitral Clauses Contained in Marine Insurance Contracts Against Nonsignatory Di-
rect Action Claimants, 27 TUL. MAR. L.J. 205, 222-23 (2002).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1011. The statute states, "Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation
and taxation by the several [s]tates of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several states." Id.
2004]
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ing the enactment of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, nearly every state "adopted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme with respect to insurance.",31 If the Act applies,
federal courts should abstain from hearing insurance issues and leave such issues
to the state courts. 32 The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been interpreted to contain
an anti-preemption provision, meaning that state law regulates the insurance busi-
ness and no federal law should impair it.33 However, debate lingers as to what
aspects of insurance transactions are considered "the business of insurance" and,
therefore, fall under the coverage of McCarran-Ferguson.34 There are further
disputes regarding the status of arbitration agreements and its application to
McCarran-Ferguson.35
In the context of insurance insolvency, the individual states, pursuant to the
states' public interest in controlling insurance companies, have the power to man-
age the dissolution and liquidation of insurance companies. 36 Many state insur-
ance laws provide exclusive and specific means of liquidating or rehabilitating an
insurance company "while protecting the rights of the insured's, creditors and the
general public."
37
Title 39 of the Ohio Code provides the structure of regulating the insurance
38business. Chapter 3903 of the Ohio Revised Code regulates the rehabilitation
and liquidation of insurance companies. 39 The purpose of the Rehabilitation and
Liquidation chapter of Title 39 is to protect "the interests of insured's, claimants,
creditors, and the public generally, with minimum interference with the normal
prerogatives of the owners and managers of insurers." 40 The Code vests broad
powers in the liquidator of an insolvent insurance company to protect the interests
of "insureds, claimants, creditors and the [general] public.' The liquidator's
broad powers are further secured in section 3903.21(B) of the Ohio Revised
Code.
31. See Nichols v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 778, 780 (E.D. Ky. 1999).
32. Gerling-Konzem Globale Rueckversicherungs-Ag v. Selcke, No. 93-C-4439, 1993 WL 443404
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding that the exercise of federal jurisdiction would disrupt the administration of
Illinois' insurance business regulatory scheme and therefore remanded to state court).
33. Costle v. Fremont Indem. Co., 839 F. Supp. 265, 274 (D. Vt. 1993).
34. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Health & Casualty Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (D. Colo. 1991).
35. See Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical
and Historical Anlaysis of Courts' Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration,
and Insolvency Statutes with the McCarran-Ferguson Act-1941-1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399 (1994).
36. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 93 (2004). See Garamendi v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App.
4th 504, 514 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
37. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 93 (2004). See Florida Dept. of Ins. v. Cypress Ins. Co., 660 So. 2d
1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
38. OHIo REV. CODE ANN., tit. 39 (West 2002).
39. Id. §§ 3903.01-3903.59.
40. Id. § 3903.02(D).
41. Id. §3903.21. Specifically referring to §3903.21(A)(11) which holds that the liquidator may
"[e]nter into such contracts as are necessary to carry out the order to liquidate, and to affirm or dis-
avow any contracts to which the insurer is a party." Id.
42. Id. §3903.21(B). This section of the Ohio code states:
The enumeration, in this section, of the powers and authority of the liquidator shall not be con-
strued as a limitation upon [the liquidator], nor shall it exclude in any manner his right to do such
other acts not herein specifically enumerated, or otherwise provided for, as may be necessary or
appropriate for the accomplishment of or in aid of the purpose of liquidation.
[Vol. 2
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Different states afford liquidators of insurance companies varying degrees of
power in the liquidation of insolvent insurance companies. Further, states differ in
what issues are included in the business of insurance and covered by McCarran-
Ferguson. In Pennsylvania, a court compelled an arbitration agreement when it
found that a contract issue involving an unpaid debt was not part of the "complex"
realm of insurance regulation. 43 The court found that McCarran-Ferguson did not
apply, so federal court was an appropriate venue. 44 The court also looked to Penn-
sylvania insurance law and determined that a liquidator "stand[s] in the shoes of
the insolvent insurer and is bound by the insurer's contractual agreements. 45
A similar result was reached in Kentucky where a federal court refused to ap-
ply McCarran-Ferguson because the case was "no more than a garden variety
contract suit which happen[ed] to involve two insurers.',46 The court implicitly
found that McCarran-Ferguson did not apply because the dispute was not part of
47the insurance business, but merely a dispute between two insurance companies.
Such an interpretation suggests a narrow scope of a liquidator's power while liq-
uidating an insolvent insurance company.
However, a district court in Kansas found McCarran-Ferguson to apply be-
cause the claims brought by the liquidator raised difficult issues which had not
been addressed in Kansas and would have a significant impact on the development
of Kansas insurance law. 4 8 The federal court abstained from hearing the case and
remanded the issue to the state court.49
When deciding if McCarran-Ferguson applies, many courts consider the dis-
puted issue and whether it falls within the state's insurance regulatory scheme.50
If an insurance issue falls outside the scope of McCarran-Ferguson coverage, then
the issue is appropriate for federal court and it appears that the enforcement of
arbitration clauses becomes more probable.Si
B. Arbitration
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 in an effort by Con-
gress to decrease the hostility in which the courts viewed arbitration.52 The goal
of the FAA was "to place arbitration agreements [on equal] footing as other con-
tracts. 53 A key provision of the code specifies that written agreements to arbi-
trate disputes "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
54
43. Koken v. Cologne Reinsurance Ltd., 34 F. Supp. 2d 240, 249 (D. Pa. 1999).
44. Id. at 256.
45. Id. (citing Kelly v. Commonwealth Mutual Ins. Co., 450 Pa. 177 (Pa. 1973)).
46. Nichols v. Vesta Fire Ins. Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (E.D. Ky. 1999) (holding that McCar-
ran-Ferguson did not apply, so the court enforced arbitration due to the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration).
47. Id.
48. Todd v. DSN Dealer Serv. Network, 861 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (D. Kan. 1994).
49. Id. at 1544.
50. Id.
51. Nichols, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
52. Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for
Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237, 1243 (2001).
53. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
54. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
2004]
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The Supreme Court has recognized a general principle that "arbitration is a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dis-
pute which he has not agreed so to submit." 5 The arbitrators "derive their author-
ity to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed in advance to submit
,,56
such grievances to arbitration.
In the context of insolvent insurance companies, some circuits have held that
the liquidator "stands in the shoes" of the insolvent insurance company.57 Of
these circuits, some will compel a liquidator to arbitrate disputes if the insolvent
insurance company agreed to do so. In other circuits, courts permit a party to
avoid arbitration clauses if it is within the liquidator's power to dismiss such a
clause under the regulatory scheme or if staying any arbitration will protect policy
holders.
59
In Ohio, the liquidator of an insurance company is conferred with broad pow-
ers. 60 Pursuant to these powers, a liquidator may disavow certain contracts en-
tered into by the insolvent insurance company, including arbitration clauses.
61
Ohio courts have consistently permitted the liquidator of an insurance company to
62avoid being compelled to arbitration. In a recent Ohio case, the court held that
arbitration clauses that affect the priority of creditors or adversely affect any party
to the liquidation proceeding do not need to be enforced.63 The court found that
the enforcement of an arbitration provision is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. 64
C. United States v. Fabe
In United States v. Fabe, the Supreme Court determined whether a statute es-
tablishing the priority of creditors in an Ohio statutory procedure for the liquida-
tion of an insolvent insurance company was regulating the business of insurance
and covered under McCarran-Ferguson. 65 This decision produced a three-part testfor the determination of whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies. 66 Part of
55. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (quoting
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,582 (1960)).
56. Id. at 648-49.
57. Koken v. Cologne Reinsurance, Ltd., 34 F. Supp. 240, 256 (D. Pa. 1999); Bennett v. Liberty
Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 1992); Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Health & Casualty Ins.
Co., 774 F. Supp. 1297, 1299 (D. Colo. 1991).
58. Koken, 34 F. Supp. at 240. See also Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., No. 91 Civ. 6245, 1994 WL
414374 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
59. Davister Corp., v. United Republic Life. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 1998). See
also Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phoenix Greek Gen. Ins. Co., No. 83 Civ. 4687, 1987 WL 28636 (S.D. N.Y.
1987); 44A AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1827 (2003).
60. Covington v. Lucia, 784 N.E.2d 186, 191 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
61. Id.
62. Id. See also Covington v. Am. Chambers Life Ins. Co., 779 N.E.2d 833, 837-38 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002).
63. Am. Chambers Life Ins. Co., 779 N.E.2d at 838.
64. Id. at 837.
65. United States Dep't of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 493 (1993).
66. Id. at 500-01. The three part test is: (1) whether the federal statute at issue specifically relates to
the business of insurance; (2) whether the state statute was enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance; (3) whether application of the federal statue would impair, interfere, or super-
sede the state statute. Id.
[Vol. 2
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this analysis was grounded in the Supreme Court's decision in Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, where a three-factor test was created to define what constitutes
the business of insurance. 67 In Fabe, the court found that the business of insur-
ance was most importantly involved with the performance of an insurance con-
tract.68 The decision held that the payment of claims made against policies was
the primary purpose of the insurance company.
69
In Davister Corp., v. United Republic Life Ins. Co., the Tenth Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Fabe, finding that under the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, the Federal Arbitration Act invalidates, impairs or supersedes the
states' ability to regulate the insurance business. 70 The court in Davister found
that permitting a creditor to remove one issue from the liquidation proceeding for
arbitration would "impair the progress" of the resolution of all matters pertaining
to the insolvent insurance company.7' Removing such matters would directly
impact the policyholders because such issues deal with the assets of the insolvent
insurance company that will be apportioned to policyholders.72 The court held
that "the issue is not whether Utah prohibits arbitration," the issue is whether "en-
forcing arbitration invalidates, impairs or supersedes the enforcement of the state
insurance regulation designed to protect the interests of policyholders. 73  The
court in Davister buttressed its logic from a Fifth Circuit case that held,
"[R]egardless of the nature of the reinsurers' action, ordering it resolved in a fo-
rum other than the receivership court nevertheless conflicts with [state] law giving
the state court the power to enjoin any action interfering with the delinquency
proceedings. 74
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Benjamin v. Pipoly, the Ohio Court of Appeals had to decide whether it
was proper for a liquidator's claims against employees of an insolvent insurance
company to be stayed pending arbitration when the liquidator was not a party to75
the arbitration agreements. The court held that Benjamin's claims against the
defendants would not be stayed pending arbitration. The court reasoned that
because the liquidator was not a party to the arbitration agreement, she was not
bound by any of its provisions.77 The court further reasoned that Ohio provided
liquidators of insurance companies with broad powers to conduct liquidation pro-
67. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982) (holding that there are three
factors to be considered in determining what constitutes the business of insurance: (1) whether the
practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; (2) whether the practice is
integral to the relationship of the insurer and the insured; (3) whether the practice is limited to entities
within the insurance industry).
68. Fabe, 508 U.S. at 503-05.
69. Id. at 505-06.
70. Davister Corp., 152 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1282.
74. Id. (quoting Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 1998)).
75. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50, 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 58-59.
2004]
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ceedings and that compelling arbitration agreements impinges on these powers
and violates public policy.
78
In order to resolve the issue, the court first recited the broad powers given to
liquidators in insurance liquidation proceedings. 79  The court noted that Ohio's
insurance-liquidation scheme has many "features designed to vest within the liq-
uidator broad and largely unfettered powers, under the supervision of the courts,
to maximize the assets available to her in discharging her duties to claimants,
shareholders, and creditors of the insolvent insurance company." 80 The court also
noted the code sections that govern arbitration.81 It then established the basis of
its holding that only parties to an arbitration agreement may invoke the arbitration
agreement.8 2
The decision recognized that a party can only be required to arbitrate if that
party agreed in writing to arbitrate those disputes. 8 3 Noting that arbitration is a
matter of contract, the court stated that a presumption against arbitration arises
when a party has not agreed to submit to arbitration.
84
The decision noted that the appellant never signed either the employment
agreement or the mutual agreements to arbitrate raising the presumption against
85arbitration. The court found that appellees cannot rebut this presumption against
86
arbitration. 6 The court then held that "when a liquidator is appointed by court
order ... she is not automatically bound by the pre-appointment contractual obli-
gations of the insurer., 87 The court held that a liquidator would only be bound if
she affirmatively elected to be bound by prior obligations. 88 Because Benjamin
was not party to the original agreements, and did not indicate that she wished to be
bound by those agreements, the arbitration agreements would not be enforced
against her.
89
Following this holding, the court continued to discuss arbitration agreements
in insurance liquidation proceedings and their relationship with prior case law.
The court made an effort to expressly overrule Fabe v. Columbus Ins. Co.,9° a case
78. Id. at 58.
79. Id. at 56. The opinion quotes OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3903.18(A) as follows: "The liquidator
shall be vested by operation of law with the title to all of the property, contracts, and rights of action
and all of the books and records of the insurer ordered liquidated, wherever located, as of the entry of
the final order of liquidation." Id.
80. Id. at 56-57.
8 1. Id. at 57. The opinion quotes OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.02(B) as follows:
If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbi-
tration, the court in which the action is pending ... shall on application of one of the parties stay the
trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement,
provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.
Id.
82. Id. (specifically stating that "prior to making any determination regarding the arbitrability of any
issue raised by the parties' claims, a court must first determine whether the written arbitration agree-
ment being invoked is in fact enforceable under basic contract precepts").
83. Id. (citing Boedeker v. Rogers, 136 Ohio App. 3d 425, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)).
84. Id. at 58.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 59.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 587 N.E.2d 966 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 2
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on which Pipoly heavily relied.9' The decision held that "where... private arbi-
tration impinges upon a broad statutory scheme that invests sweeping powers in a
state official, enforcement of arbitration ipso facto violates public policy. '92 The
decision focused on the policy that insurance liquidators should be able to act
without interference from other agencies. 93 The court found that the public policy
regarding a liquidator's broad power "defeats any general attitude of the courts
favoring arbitration.' 94 The court found that a liquidator should never be com-
pelled to arbitration against her will because that would interfere with the liquida-
tor's powers and would adversely affect the insolvent insurer's assets.95
The court also rejected an argument that the liquidator should be estopped
from disavowing the arbitration agreements because the disavowal came too
late. 6 The decision refused to recognize the argument that a liquidator is subject
to temporal limitations as to when she can disavow a contract. 97 The decision also
rejected the argument that the liquidator was seeking a declaration of her rights
because the claims in Benjamin's lawsuit are not related to failures under the em-
ployment contracts, but rather breaches of fiduciary and statutory duties. 98 Fi-
nally, the court reasoned that its decision is not violative of the FAA, contrary to




Although the court's decision in Benjamin was correct, its holding that pri-
vate arbitration ipso facto violates public policy is too aggressive a stance against
arbitration and was not necessary to reach the holding of the case.1t °  The court
could have decided this case without taking an affirmative, hostile position against
the enforcement of arbitration agreements in insurance liquidation proceedings.
The decision held that when a liquidator of an insolvent insurance company is
appointed by the court, that individual is "not bound by pre-appointment contrac-
tual obligations ... ,,1 The court found that a liquidator may affirmatively elect
to be bound to any contracts through affirmation.' 0 However, baring such action,
a liquidator who was not party to the agreement is not bound by the arbitration
agreements. 0 3 The court found that the liquidator did not expressly assume any
of the arbitration provisions and was not bound by the agreements. °4 The logic
and the opinion should have ceased at this point.
91. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50,60 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
92. Id. at 59.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 60.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 62.
97. Id. (distinguishing Covington v. MetroHealth Sys., 782 N.E.2d 624 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)).
98. Id. at 63 (distinguishing Gerig v. Kahn, 769 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 2002)).
99. Id.
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Following this portion of the decision, the Benjamin court took a hostile posi-
tion against arbitration agreements in the liquidation setting. The court reasoned
that Ohio's broad statutory powers provided to the liquidator include a presump-
tion against arbitration agreements if the liquidator was never party to any agree-
ment and did not assume any agreement. 10 5 This holding expressly rejected the
holding in Fabe v. Columbus Ins. Co., 106 which stated that consideration should be
given to both the liquidator's powers and arbitration agreements. 1
07
Although the court held that "compelling arbitration against the will of the
liquidator will always interfere with the liquidator's powers and will always ad-
versely affect the insolvent insurer's assets,"'1 8 it failed to discuss what happens if
roles are reversed and the liquidator seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement. If
the enforcement of arbitration agreements is a per se violation of public policy,
then liquidators presumptively do not have the ability to affirm certain arbitration
agreements. However, this situation represents a violation of the liquidator's
broad power to preserve the insolvent insurance company's assets and distribute
funds to creditors as deemed necessary.
The decision should have focused on the powers that state legislation pro-
vides to liquidators of insurance companies. If a state provides a liquidator with
the power to assume or reject any contract, then the courts should respect such a
provision. Similarly, if a statute provides that no arbitration agreement should be
enforced in liquidation proceedings, then the state has directly addressed the ques-
tion of arbitration and such legislation should be respected. However, if a state
does not have statutes that specifically address the enforcement of arbitration
agreements, then courts should look to the statutes to decide what powers a liqui-
dator does possess. State courts have reached disparate conclusions on such is-
sues, but ultimately court decisions are based on the state's insurance statutes.l°9
This conflict is demonstrated by contrasting New York and Pennsylvania case
law. In New York, the courts have held that liquidators are not required to arbi-
trate claims found in insurance companies' contracts."0 These decisions have
interpreted Article 74 of the New York Insurance Law, which regulates the liqui-
dation of domestic insurance companies, as possessing exclusive jurisdiction over
the liquidation of insurance companies."' Therefore, the New York legislation
has adopted the full breadth of the reverse preemption power in insurance pro-
ceedings for states to govern the business of insurance in accordance with McCar-
ran-Ferguson. New York courts have consistently held that McCarran-
Ferguson preempts the FAA and liquidators can avoid arbitration." 
3
105. Id. at 60.
106. Id.
107. Fabe v. Columbus Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 966,971-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
108. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50, 60 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
109. Rice, supra note 35, at 431-40.
110. See Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 567 N.E.2d 969 (N.Y. 1990). See also Corcoran v. Universal
Reinsurance Corp., 713 F. Supp 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Knickerbocker Agency, Inc. v. Holz, 149 N.E.2d
885 (N.Y. 1958).
111. See Washburn v. Corcoran, 643 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that "[tihe applica-
tion of the Federal Arbitration Act to require arbitration in spite of the contrary command of Article 74
is therefore barred by McCarran-Ferguson").
112. Id.
113. See In re Union Indem. Ins. Co., 521 N.Y.S.2d 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); Union Indem. Ins. Co.
of New York v. United States of Amer., 216 A.D.2d 48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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On Hostile Ground
In contrast, Pennsylvania courts have never designated the court system as the
exclusive forum for disputes involving insolvent insurance companies.' 14 Penn-
sylvania case law has noted that arbitration agreements are valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable even in insolvent insurance proceedings. 1 5 Pennsylvania insurance
statutes have not specifically addressed the powers of liquidators and their rela-
tionship with arbitration so the Pennsylvania courts are able to enforce arbitration
agreements.
To take an affirmatively hostile position against the enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements may violate public policy. As noted in the contrast between New
York and Pennsylvania law, the state statutes should dictate the effects of arbitra-
tion agreements on insurance liquidators. The court in Benjamin stated, "the gen-
eral policy favoring arbitration must yield to countervailing policies embodied in
the liquidation act."" 6 This statement would more appropriately read that the
powers conferred by state legislatures to liquidators of insolvent insurance com-
panies should be given more deference than contrary federal law, pursuant to the
effect of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. However, in Ohio, the statutes do not spe-
cifically state that arbitration agreements must always be voided. Rather, the stat-
ute allows the liquidator to affirm or disavow any contracts. Therefore, a per se
rule against arbitration may impinge on the liquidator's ability to affirm any of the
contracts. The court stated:
To permit the officers and directors of a regulated industry to attempt to
defeat the liquidation statutes by privately contracting to resolve allega-
tions of corporate mismanagement in a private forum of their own choos-
ing is contrary to the purposes of the liquidation act and prejudicial to the
rights of policyholders and creditors who have been harmed by the insol-
vency of the corporations." 17
This statement, rather than attacking the enforcement of all arbitration agree-
ments, could have been written to state that a liquidator of an insolvent insurance
company may elect not to enforce contracts entered into by directors and officers
of insolvent corporations, including such contracts that contain arbitration agree-
ments. The liquidator may avoid such contracts pursuant to the power granted by
the appropriate insurance statutes. In the present case, the liquidator has the
power to affirm or disavow contracts to which the insurer is a party.' 8 This
power is sufficiently strong to avoid any arbitration agreements found in the in-
surer's employment contracts.
114. See Michael J. Sehr et al., Excess, Surplus, and Reinsurance: Recent Developments, 27 TORT &
INs. L.J. 227 (1992).
115. Foster v. Philadelphia Mfrs., 592 A.2d 131 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
116. Benjamin, 800 N.E.2d 50, 60-61 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (citing Covington v. Lucia, 784 N.E.2d
186 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2003)).
117. Id. at 61.
118. Id. at 60.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the court in Benjamin reached the correct result, the logic that the
court used took an unnecessarily hostile position against the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements found in insolvent insurance companies. The court could have
reached its decision by focusing solely on the broad powers conferred to a liquida-
tor to affirm or disavow contracts. Rejecting the holding in Fabe v. Columbus Ins.
Co. was unnecessary to reach the correct result. This narrow holding is more
appropriate in order to respect the positive position of arbitration and the powers
of a liquidator.
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